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Abstract
We give an axiomatic foundation to the updating rule proposed by [Sarin, R.
and Wakker, P. P. (1998). Revealed likelihood and knightian uncertainty. Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty 16(3):223-250.] for CEU preferences. This rule is dynam-
ically consistent but non-consequentialist, since forgone consequences are relevant
for conditioning. Whereas it does not work universally, but only when counterfac-
tuals outcomes are better and/or worse than the ones resulting on the conditioning
event, the rule has many interesting features, since it is able to describe Ellsberg-
type preferences together with a recursive structure of the criterion.
Keywords: Choquet Expected Utility; Capacities; Dynamic consistency; Updating
JEL classification numbers: D 81, D 83
1 Introduction
Ambiguity is defined as a context in which probabilistic information about events is not
given to the decision maker. In decision theory under ambiguity, typical violations of
the standard model have led to the development of several generalizations, known as
non-expected utility criteria. In this paper, we will focus on one of the most popular
approaches, namely the Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) model. This model, firstly ax-
iomatized by Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989), assumes that the decision maker’s
beliefs are represented by a non-necessarily additive probability, or capacity. It has been
successfully applied to various economic situations, notably in applications of decision
theory (finance, insurance...). However, a wide range of economic problems involves se-
quential resolution of the uncertainty, and the use of CEU model in this context is a major
concern.
In such situations, we have to integrate new information in the decision process. How
to perform it is often specified by a set of axioms applied on individual preferences (see, for
instance, Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993, and Eichberger et al., 2007). Two important ax-
ioms are consequentialism and dynamic consistency. The former implies that conditional
preferences only depends on the conditioning event, while the latter links unconditional
and conditional preferences. These two assumptions together are incompatible with non-
additive beliefs (e.g. Ghirardato, 2002, and Lapied and Toquebeuf, 2010): under conse-
quentialism, CEU preferences are dynamically consistent if and only if beliefs are additive
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and updated according to Bayes rule. Consequently, axiomatic works cited above keep
consequentialism but weaken dynamic consistency1. Further, even if consequentialism is
not assumed, dynamic consistency is not, in general, satisfied by CEU preferences (see
Epstein and Le Breton, 1993, and Eichberger and Kelsey, 1996).
Sarin and Wakker (1998a) have proposed an updating rule for CEU preferences. Since
they argue that it is dynamically consistent but non-consequentialist, in the sense that
counterfactual outcomes may be relevant for conditioning, it has to be studied in an ax-
iomatic framework. Dropping consequentialism, when it is possible, may have interesting
implications for behavior under uncertainty, as illustrated by Machina (1989). In this
paper, we show that CEU preferences satisfy a restricted version of dynamic consistency -
since it only holds when the conditioning event is f -convex, if and only if they are updated
according to the rule proposed by Sarin and Wakker. Nevertheless, conditional prefer-
ences are only defined for f -convex events: the price to pay for relaxing consequentialism.
Stated otherwise, the largest set of acts on which CEU preferences exhibit a recursive
structure consists in those acts that are comonotonic with their conditional expectations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our set-up and axioms.
In section 3, we report the main result and discuss some of its implications.
2 Set-up and axioms
2.1 Set-up
We consider a state space S containing elements denoted by s. An event is a subset of S
and for all A ⊂ S we note Ac the event S −A. S is endowed with a sigma-algebra noted
Σ so that (S,Σ) is a measurable space. The set of outcomes is X and it is assumed to be
a connected and separable topological space. The set of simple acts f : S → X, that are
Σ-measurable functions taking only finite values, is denoted by A, and f gE refers to the
act h yielding h(s) = f(s) when s ∈ E and h(s) = g(s) when s ∈ Ec.
A decision maker (DM for short) is characterized by a class of preference relations
{<E}E∈Σ on A. For all E ∈ Σ, the conditional preference <E compares acts when she
is informed that the right state is in E. When E = S, <S is noted < and denotes the
unconditional preference. Abusing notations, we consider that X is the set of constant
acts f(.) such that f(s) = x for all s ∈ S. Then the preference relation < on A induces
a preference relation on X, also denoted by <. We assume that the DM’s tastes are
stable, in the sense that for all E ∈ Σ, <E≡< on X. Then < on X is represented by
a continuous and strictly increasing utility function u : X → R that does not change
with information arrivals. In other words, u(.) is state-independent. Throughout we shall
assume the following structural assumption on X :
Assumption 1 (Non-triviality). There exist a best and a worst outcome, i.e. ∃x∗, x∗ ∈ X
such that x∗  x∗ and x∗ < x < x∗ for all x ∈ X.
The present work assumes that each preference relation<E is represented by a Choquet
Expected Utility (CEU) functional2 noted IE[u(.)]. In this model, the DM’s beliefs are
1Another solution consists to specify information sets by a given and fixed filtration, see for instance
Sarin and Wakker (1998b), Eichberger et al. (2005), and Dominiak and Lefort (2011).
2Equivalently, one could assume that each preference relation satisfy a set of axioms necessary and
sufficient to the existence of a CEU representation. See, among others, Gilboa (1987) and Wakker (1989)
(for the finite case).
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represented by a normalized and monotonic set function νE : Σ → R, called Choquet
capacity, such that (i) νE(E) = 1 and νE(E
c) = 0 and (ii) for all A,B ∈ Σ, A ⊆ B ⇒
νE(A) ≤ νE(B). Further, when E = S, νS(.) is simply noted ν(.). It is said to be convex
(concave) if for all A,B ∈ Σ, we have ν(A) + ν(B) ≤ (≥)ν(A ∪ B) + ν(A ∩ B), and it
is a probability if ≤ (≥) is replaced by =. In order to define the Choquet integral, we
associate to any act f ∈ A the coarsest finite partition over S, Pf = {A1, ..., An}, to
which f is measurable and ordered. Therefore, if s, s′ ∈ Ai, for any i = 1, ..., n, then
f(s) ∼ f(s′) and for i, j = 1, ..., n, i < j, s ∈ Ai and s′ ∈ Aj imply f(s′) < f(s). Hence
the CEU of act f ≡ (xi, Ai)ni=1 with respect to ν(.), noted I[u(f)], can be written as
n−1∑
i=1
u(xi) · [ν(Ai ∪ ... ∪ An)− ν(Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ An)] + u(xn)ν(An)
We denote by Σ(f) = {A ⊂ Pf} the algebra generated by f . Then pf : Σ(f) → [0, 1]
is the probability (or ”decision weight” in the terminology of Sarin and Wakker, 1998a)
used to value f , such that pf (Ai) = ν(Ai ∪ ... ∪ An) − ν(Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ An) for i < n and
pf (An) = ν(An). Two acts f and g are said to be comonotonic if there are no s, s
′ ∈ S
such that f(s)  f(s′) and g(s′)  g(s). The following proposition is straightforward:
Proposition 1. For two comonotonic acts f, g ∈ A, if Σ(f) ∩ Σ(g) 6= ∅ then ∀A ∈
Σ(f) ∩ Σ(g), pf (A) = pg(A).
This property of the CEU model is closed to the ”tail-separability” of Machina
(2009). The following definition, proposed by Eichberger and Kelsey (1996), will be
useful throughout.
Definition 1 (Non-null event). An event E ∈ Σ is said to be non-null if ν(B∪E) > ν(B)
for any B ∈ Σ such that B ∩ E = ∅.
In the sequel, we will assume that the conditioning event E is non-null, otherwise
IE[u(.)] will be not defined.
Definition 2 (f -convexity). An event E is f -convex3 if for all s′, s′′ ∈ E and s ∈ S, if
f(s′) < f(s) < f(s′′) then s ∈ E.
This property has firstly been proposed by Gilboa (1987). For instance, for h ≡
(x∗, A;x∗, Ac) and f ≡ xhE, E is straightforwardly f -convex. In words, we say that
event E is f−convex if consequences of f outside of E are unanimously preferred and/or
un-preferred to consequences yielding by f on E. In the context of updating of CEU
preferences, f -convexity was implicit in Chateauneuf et al. (2001) and made explicit by
Koida (2010).
2.2 Dynamic consistency and consequentialism
A common definition of dynamic consistency4 requires that an act is unconditionally
weakly preferred to an other if and only if it is also weakly preferred conditionally to the
event on which these acts differ. Such a requirement is clearly too strong in the Choquet
framework and it is well known that strictly non-additive CEU preferences cannot satisfy
this axiom (see Eichberger and Kelsey 1996). Hence we restrict it to f -convex conditioning
events.
3Sarin and Wakker (1998a) called such an event ”connected”.
4See, for instance, Epstein and Le Breton (1993), Sarin and Wakker (1998b), Ghirardato (2002) and
Dominiak and Lefort (2011).
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Axiom 1 (f -convex Dynamic Consistency). For all f, g ∈ A and any non-null event
E ∈ Σ such that E is both f -convex and gfE-convex, f < gfE if and only if f <E gfE.
Most of approaches of updating of non-expected utility preferences assume the follow-
ing axiom:
Axiom 2 (Consequentialism). For all f, g ∈ A and E ∈ Σ, f ∼E f gE.
Consequentialism makes it easier to define conditional beliefs when new information is
gathered. It means that conditional preferences only depends on the conditioning event.
Therefore, it can be divided in two parts:
(i) Irrelevance of forgone consequences (axiom 2 above);
(ii) History-independence of conditional preferences: the DM does not look backward
to make her later choices.
Part (ii) is implicit in our set-up. On the opposite, within the multiple prior frame-
work, Hanany and Klibanoff (2007,2009) keep part (i) but drop (ii): in their approach,
conditioning depends on the initially chosen act.
Unfortunately, since we do not assume consequentialism, each conditional CEU IE[u(.)]
is only defined when E is f -convex. Nevertheless, dropping consequentialism may have
sense for non-expected utility maximizers, as illustrated by Machina (1989).
3 Results and discussion
3.1 The main result
We state that f -convex dynamic consistency holds if and only if conditional decision
weights are given by the updating rule proposed by Sarin and Wakker (1998a). In this
case, the value of any f ≡ (xi, Ai)ni=1 such that xn < ... < x1, conditional to any non-null
and f -convex E ∈ Σ, is given by:
IE[u(f)] =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)
pf (Ai ∩ E)
pf (E)
(1)
Then the SW rule consists to apply the Bayes updating rule for probabilities to pf (.):
pfE(A) =
pf (A ∩ E)
pf (E)
(2)
Further, it contains an implicit definition of the conditional capacity νfE(.):
νfE(A) =
ν((A ∩ E) ∪Df (E))− ν(Df (E))
ν(E ∪Df (E))− ν(Df (E)) (3)
where Df (E) = {s ∈ Ec|∀s′ ∈ E, f(s) < f(s′)}, hence it is named ”dominating event” by
Sarin and Wakker (1998a). Then an alternative way of writing the SW rule consists to
consider the capacity ν(.) rather than the decision weight pf (.).
Proposition 2. For any f ∈ A, let E ∈ Σ be f -convex and non-null. Then,∫
S
u(f)dνfE =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)
pf (Ai ∩ E)
pf (E)
(4)
where νfE(.) is given by eq. (3).
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Proof W.l.o.g., let f = (xi, Ai)
n
i=1 such that xn < ... < x1. Let Ac ∩ Ec = ∪ki=1Ai,
E = ∪li=k+1Ai and A ∩ Ec = ∪ni=l+1Ai. We have:∫
S
u ◦ fdνfE =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)[ν
f
E(Ai ∪ ... ∪ An)− νfE(Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ An)] (5)
where νfE(Ai ∪ ... ∪ An)− νE(Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ An) is equal to
ν(Ai ∪ ... ∪ Al ∪Df (E))− ν(Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ Al ∪Df (E))
ν(E ∪Df (E))− ν(Df (E)) (6)
where Df (E) = A ∩ Ec and the denominator is not equal to zero since E is non-null.
Since
pf (E) =
l∑
i=k+1
[ν(Ai ∪ ... ∪ An)− ν(Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ An)] (7)
= ν(E ∪Df (E))− ν(Df (E)) (8)
and
pf (Ai ∩ E) = ν(Ai ∪ ... ∪ Al ∪Df (E))− ν(Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ Al ∪Df (E)) (9)
for all i = k + 1, ..., l, eq. (5) is equivalent to eq. (4) with νfE(.) defined by eq. (3).
Therefore, the Choquet expectation of u ◦ f w.r.t. νfE(.) and its additive expectation
w.r.t. pfE(.) coincide. The updating rule of eq. (3) has been separately studied by Young
(1998), who named it the ”Generalized Bayes rule”, since it generalizes the Gilboa and
Schmeidler f−Bayesian approach (see subsection 3.2 below). The following proposition
lists some elementary properties of νfE(.) and, together with proposition 2, it ensures that
IE[u(f)] defined by eq. (1) is a conditional CEU.
Proposition 3. Let f ∈ A, let E ∈ Σ be non-null and f -convex and let νfE(.) be given by
eq. (3). Then the following statements hold:
(i) If ν(.) is convex (concave) then νfE(.) is convex (concave), too;
(ii) If ν(.) is additive, then νfE(.) is additive, too, and it is given by the Bayes updating
rule for probabilities;
(iii) νfE(S) = ν
f
E(E) = 1, ν
f
E(∅) = νfE(Ec) = 0, and ∀A,B ∈ Σ, A ⊆ B ⇒ νfE(A) ≤
νfE(B);
Proof We just prove statement (i). Other statements are straightforward. If ν(.) is
convex (concave), then, given A1, A2 ∈ Σ,
ν(A1 ∩ E) ∪Df (E)) + ν(A2 ∩ E) ∪Df (E))
≤ (≥)ν[((A1 ∩ E) ∪Df (E)) ∪ ((A2 ∩ E) ∪Df (E))]
+ ν[((A1 ∩ E) ∪Df (E)) ∩ ((A2 ∩ E) ∪Df (E))]
hence
ν((A1 ∩ E) ∪Df (E)) + ν((A2 ∩ E) ∪Df (E))
≤ (≥)ν[((A1 ∪ A2) ∩ E) ∪Df (E)] + ν[((A1 ∩ A2) ∩ E) ∪Df (E)]
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Therefore,
νfE(A1) + ν
f
E(A2) ≤ (≥)νfE(A1 ∪ A2) + νfE(A1 ∩ A2)
The reader is referred to Young (1998) for a wider study of (statistical) properties
of the SW rule. Now we state our main result, that characterizes the conditional CEU
representation of <E.
Theorem 1. Let {<E}E∈Σ be a class of preference relations on A represented by IE[u(.)]
for all E ∈ Σ. Then the following statements are equivalent :
(i) {<E}E∈Σ satisfy f -convex dynamic consistency;
(ii) For any f ∈ A and any non-null f -convex E ∈ Σ, IE[u(f)] is given by eq. (1).
Lemma 1. Let E ∈ Σ be non-null and f -convex. Then there exists a unique x ∈ X
satisfying
u(x) =
∫
S
u(f)1E
pf (E)
dpf (10)
where 1E is the characteristic function of E.
Proof Since X is a connected and separable topological space, continuity of the CEU
representation and assumption 1 imply that there exists x ∈ X such that f ∼ xfE. Further,
x is unique by monotonicity of <. Moreover, f(s) < x < f(s′) for any s ∈ Df (E) and
any s′ ∈ D¯f (E), hence xfE is comonotonic with f . In addition, Σ(xfE) ⊂ Σ(f). Therefore,
by proposition 1, we have I(xfE) =
∫
S
u(xfE)dp
f , hence I[u(f)] = I[u(xfE)] if and only if
I[u(f)1E] = I[u(x
f
E)1E] if and only if u(x) = I[u(f)1E]/p
f (E). Finally, E is assumed to
be non-null, hence pf (E) > 0 thus eq. (10) is well defined.
Proof of the theorem Part A (i) ⇒ (ii). Let E ∈ Σ be f -convex. Then, by
lemma 1, there exists x ∈ X such that eq. (10) holds. Further, under axiom (1), we
have f ∼ xfE if and only if u(x) = IE[u(f)], hence IE[u(f)] is defined by eq. (1), as claimed.
Part B (ii) ⇒ (i). By lemma 1, for all f, g ∈ A such that E is both f -convex
and gfE-convex, we have f < g if and only if xEf < yEf , where, under the SW rule,
u(x) = IE[u(f)] and u(y) = IE[u(g
f
E)]. By monotonicity of <, x
f
E < y
f
E implies x < y,
that is equivalent to f <E gfE.
It is worth noting that, as in the Bayesian approach, preferences are dynamically
consistent if and only if they are updated according to the Bayes rule. The SW rule is,
by nature, restricted to conditioning events sharing the property of f -convexity. Indeed,
applying the SW rule on a larger set of conditioning events entails that νfE(.) in eq. (3)
may be non-normalized or non-monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion. Therefore, if ν(.) is strictly
non-additive, the set of f−convex events is the largest set on which < admit a dynamically
consistent updating.
3.2 Gilboa and Schmeidler and the f−Bayesian approach
The SW rule axiomatized in the present work rests on the f−Bayesian approach initiated
by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). Updating rules sharing this property are, notably, the
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Bayes rule and the Dempster-Shafer rule. If we consider eq. (3), we observe that the
former is obtained when Ec = D¯f (E):
νfE(A) =
ν(A ∩ E)
ν(E)
(11)
whereas the latter is used when Ec = Df (E):
νfE(A) =
ν((A ∩ E) ∪ Ec)− ν(Ec)
1− ν(Ec) (12)
Then it is possible to adopt different treatment of ambiguity, depending on the nature of
information. Good news involve the DM uses the Bayes update whereas bad news imply
the use of the Dempster-Shafer update. Alternating these two updating rules has already
been made by Chateauneuf et al. (2001), with more restrictive assumptions.
3.3 The Ellsberg’s paradox
Contrarily to other recursive models of choice under ambiguity, the one we propose is able
to describe a dynamic version of the Ellsberg’s paradox, similar to Epstein and Schneider
(2003) example 4-15.
A CEU decision maker is facing an urn containing 30 red balls and 60 blue or green
balls. At time 1, a ball is drawn and the decision maker knows whether this ball is green
or not. At time 2, the color of this ball is fully revealed to the decision maker. Then
the state space S is partitioned by events R,B and G, that have obvious signification,
and conditional preferences are {<R∪B,<G}. Let E = R ∪ B. Several bets, that are
{R,B,G}-measurable maps from S to X = {0, 1}, are proposed to the DM. Let f ≡
(1, 0, 0), g ≡ (0, 1, 0), f ′ ≡ f 1E and g′ ≡ g1E. Ellsberg-type preferences are f  g and
g′  f ′, hence a possible capacity is ν(B) = ν(G) = 1/6 and ν(R∪B) = ν(R∪G) = 1/2.
For simplicity, assume that the utility u(.) is the identity. Note that the conditioning
event E is both fxE-convex and g
x
E-convex, for any x ∈ X. Then, by theorem 1, f -convex
dynamic consistency holds if and only if conditional Choquet preferences are given by:
IE(f) =
2
3
>
1
3
= IE(g) (13)
and
IE(f
′) =
2
5
<
3
5
= IE(g
′) (14)
according to ex-ante preferences. In eq. (13), conditional capacities are given by the
Bayes rule, whereas the DM uses the Dempster-Shafer update in eq. (14). Therefore, one
can state the following observation:
Observation 1. Consequentialism is violated by eq. (13) and (14) since f E g and
g1E E f 1E.
This example makes it particularly clear that ambiguity aversion is not, by itself,
contradictory with dynamic consistency if consequentialism is dropped.
5A similar extension of this famous paradox is experimented by Dominiak, Dursch and Lefort (2009).
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3.4 The law of iterated expectations
In this subsection, we turn our attention on cases with a number m ≥ 2 of conditioning
events in order to present relations among the law of iterated expectations, dynamic
consistency, and the SW update rule. Then we consider a class of CEU preferences {<j
}j=0,...,m where <j designates the conditional preference to event Ej and the unconditional
preference when j = 0, such that E0 = S. Similarly, Ij[u(.)] is the CEU functional w.r.t.
capacity νj(.), conditional on event Ej, and I0[u(.)] is the CEU representation of <0.
Let fj ∈ X be the conditional certainty equivalent of act f on event Ej, such that
fj := u
−1[Ij(u(f))]. Then f˜ ≡ [fj, Ej]mj=1 refers to the conditional certainty equivalent act
of f . An important feature of the SW rule is that it allows the law of iterated expectations
to hold (Zimper, 2011), that is
I[u(f)] = I[I1[u(f)], ..., Im[u(f)]] (15)
or, equivalently, I[u(f)] = I[u(f˜)]. It makes the model tractable with applications, thanks
to the use of a folding back procedure. Obviously, the relation (15) is only valid when
each Ej is f -convex. This condition is equivalent to comonotonicity of f with f˜ .
Theorem 2. Let {<j}j=0,...,m be a class of preference relations on A represented by Ij[u(.)]
for all j = 0, ...,m. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) For any f ∈ A, the law of iterated expectations holds when f is comonotonic with
its conditional certainty equivalent act;
(ii) {<j}j=0,...,m satisfy f -convex dynamic consistency;
(iii) For any f ∈ A and any j = 1, ...,m such that Ej is f -convex, Ij[u(f)] uses the
decision weight pfj (.) given by:
pfj (A) =
p(A ∩ Ej)
p(Ej)
, A ∈ Σ (16)
Proof Part A. (i)⇒ (ii). Let f, g ∈ A be such that f < g. Assume that f and g differ
only on event Ej, for any j = 1, ...,m. Then, under the law of iterated expectations, f < g
if and only if I[u(f˜)] ≥ I[u(g˜)] hence, by monotonicity of I[u(.)], Ij[u(f)] ≥ Ij[u(g)]. Now
we prove that each Ej is necessarily f -convex. W.l.o.g., let f˜ be ordered in the following
way: f˜m < ... < f˜1. Assume that, for s′, s′′ ∈ Ej and s ∈ Ei, we have f(s′) < f(s) < f(s′′).
Hence comonotonicity of f with f˜ entails that if i > j, then f(s′′) < f(s), and if i < j
then f˜(s) < f˜(s′). For strict preferences, we get a contradiction thus i = j. Then
comonotonicity of f with f˜ implies f(s′) < f(s) < f(s′′) only if s ∈ Ej.
Part B. (ii)⇒ (iii). The proof of part A of theorem 1 may be adapted with E = Ej
for each j = 1, ...,m.
Part C. (iii)⇒ (i). See Zimper (2011) and Lapied and Toquebeuf (2011).
Finally, note that if we also assume consequentialism together with a convex range
capacity, then one should obtain the result of Koida (2010): νj(.), for j = 0, ...,m, must
exhibit an exponential form. It should be noted that the restriction of dynamic consistency
in axiom 1 is analogous enough to the one proposed by Koida for his recursion axioms
linking acts and two-stage acts. Indeed, ”Reduction of two-stage acts” is only imposed on
nest-monotonic acts, that are acts which are comonotonic with their conditional certainty
equivalent act, in our terminology.
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